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ABSTRACT

Bridges are vital components of the United States surface transportation
infrastructure and, moreover, support the growth of our nation’s economy. However,
over the past few decades the design capacity and service condition of many bridges in
the U.S. has been challenged. Numerous incidents of bridge collapse call for an urgent
need to develop a systematic method of assessing the failure risks and identifying the
initiating events that can lead to a bridge collapse. This thesis presents a process of
bridge failure risk analysis through fault-tree modeling and identification of specific
countermeasures, to minimize failure risk, related to structural health monitoring (SHM).
The fault-tree analysis (FTA) process involves development of a visual fault-tree
model, identification of minimal cut sets, assignment of basic event probabilities, and
ranking of minimal cut sets according to probability of occurrence. The ranked minimal
cut sets are used to identify SHM sensors that can reduce the causal factors associated
with bridge failure.
The use of FTA as a risk assessment method for bridge collapse was found to be
an improvement on current risk analysis methods, however, it is not a replacement. It is
best used in combination with visual inspections and SHM sensors. The added benefits
of FTA are its ability to identify initiating events to bridge failure through assessment of
bridge components and their relationships to one another. It also has the advantage of
being capable of assessing internal bridge components.

These aspects make the

qualitative analysis component of FTA a great tool for determining the initiating bridge
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failure events. The deficiencies of FTA arise in quantitative analysis. There is often a
lack of numerical data available on a basic event’s contribution to bridge failure;
however, expert opinion, sensitivity analysis, and probabilistic ranges can sometimes
provide information accurate enough for use in countermeasure assessment and
application. With validation data difficult to find, the accuracy of the quantitative results
cannot be quantified with certainty; therefore, more reliable probabilistic data would
make FTA a more successful bridge risk assessment tool.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Bridge Failure in the United States
There were 1,814 bridges (includes road, rail and pedestrian bridges) that failed
between 1800 and 2009, according to a study conducted by Sharma and Mohan (2011).
Road bridge failures accounted for 62% of those failures with 1,132 failures (Sharma and
Mohan 2011). The top five bridge types to fail in order from the most to least failures
are: beam/girder, truss, slab, stringer and arch bridges. When broken down to the type of
bridge and material, the top five bridge failures occur in steel beam/girder, steel truss,
concrete beam/girder, concrete slab and timber beam/girder bridges. A list of the top 15
bridge failures according to each category can be seen in Table 1-1.

Table 1-1. Top 15 Bridge Failures in the United States (Sharma and Mohan 2011)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
15

Bridge Type
Beam/Girder
Truss
Slab
Stringer
Arch
Culvert
Box Girder
Covered
Span
Cable
Corrugated Pipe
Box
Bailey
Tied Arch
Bascule

28.8%
24.5%
4.8%
3.6%
1.9%
1.5%
1.3%
1.2%
1.0%
0.8%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%

1
3
4
5
7
8
10
13
14
15

1

Bridge Type and Material
Steel Beam/Girder
Steel Truss
Concrete Beam/Girder
Concrete Slab
Timber Beam/Girder
Timber Stringer
Steel Stringer
Timber Covered
Concrete Box Girder
Timber Truss
Concrete Arch
Steel Culvert
Steel Cable
Steel Span
Concrete Culvert

20.0%
20.0%
6.1%
4.7%
1.8%
1.8%
1.7%
1.2%
1.2%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
0.8%
0.6%
0.5%

Several different events cause these bridge failures. All the causes of bridge
failure noted by Sharma and Mohan (2011) can be seen in Table 1-2. Hydraulic events
are the leading causes of all bridge failures in the United States, accounting for over half
of the failures. The leading hydraulic events were floods and scour, accounting for 38%
and 11% of bridge failures, respectively (Sharma and Mohan 2011). Of these two failure
modes, floods have been found to cause failure within the first two years of the bridge
service life, where most scour failures take multiple years to occur (Smith 1976). Usually
failure events take multiple years to occur, unless they are related to a catastrophic
natural disaster or major design or construction error. The majority of these failure
events may be prevented by identifying, quantifying and managing risks that occur over
time.

Table 1-2. Causes of Bridge Failures in the United States
(Sharma and Mohan 2011)
Causes of Failure
Hydraulic
Collision
Overload
Deterioration
Fire
Design
Earthquake
Construction
Ice
Strom/Hurricane/Tsunami
Fatigued Steel
Soil
Miscellaneous

% of Total Failures
54.0
14.0
12.3
5.4
2.8
1.3
1.1
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.5
0.2
5.5
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When bridge failures occur, they can have a significant effect on the economy and
public well-being, which can be seen by the August 1, 2007 collapse of the I-35 Bridge
over the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, MN.

According to the National

Transportation Safety Board Accident Report (2008), the collapse was the result of:
“…insufficient bridge design firm quality control procedures for designing
bridges, and insufficient Federal and State procedures for reviewing and
approving bridge design plans and calculations; lack of guidance for bridge
owners with regard to the placement of construction loads on bridges during
repair or maintenance activities; exclusion of gusset plates in bridge load rating
guidance; lack of inspection guidance for conditions of gusset plate distortion;
and inadequate use of technologies for accurately assessing the condition of
gusset plates on deck truss bridges.”
The bridge was a 1,907-foot-long deck truss bridge consisting of eight lanes of which
only four lanes were open to traffic the day of the collapse due to construction taking
place on the bridge. At the time of failure, 111 vehicles were on the 456-foot portion of
the main span that collapsed. The end result was 13 fatalities and 145 injuries (National
Transportation Safety Board 2008). In addition to injuries and loss of life, the collapse
had an effect on the transportation network. Since the I-35 Bridge no longer existed, the
140,000 vehicles that traveled the I-35 Bridge daily had to find a different route to cross
the Mississippi River (Zhu et al. 2010). As a result, the number of vehicles on the
remaining bridges crossing the Mississippi River increased an average of 21% and the
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ridership of public transportation increased 6.6% (Zhu et al. 2010). These changes can
have an effect on the condition of the remaining bridges and transportation.
The numerous bridge failures and their impacts portray a need for bridge
management improvements; however, budget cut-backs have made the task of making
needed repairs to bridges difficult (Pearson-Kirk 2008). This illustrates the need for a
risk analysis tool to rank bridges according to their risk factor, which could help bridge
managers decide where to focus their funds and efforts. With a proficient, systematic
way to assess the risk of the bridges, the bridge management system could be more
efficient and reduce the amount of bridge failures seen in the United States in the future.

Bridge Failure Analysis Methods
Current bridge risk analysis methods and tools developed are: visual bridge
inspections, Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) sensors, computerized simulations, and
computerized knowledge-based systems. The purpose of the visual inspections is to look
for signs and symptoms of deterioration that could lead to failure. Structural health
monitoring tools look for symptoms using sensors located on the bridge that can be
connected to a computer network. Computerized models and simulations were created to
predict failure based on historical data and trends.

Two example computerized

simulation models that have been developed are Pontis (Floyd 2010) and Artificial
Neural Network (ANN) (Huang 2010).

In addition to historical data and trends,

computerized knowledge-based systems compile and input expert opinions and results
from other methods (e.g. visual inspections).
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BRIDGIT is a two-component

computerized knowledge-based system (de Brito et al. 1997). More detail on how each
of these risk analysis methods work will be provided in Chapter 2.
Each method discussed has some limitations or downfalls, many of which can be
resolved using fault-tree analysis (FTA). Some of the limitations and FTA resolutions for
the various methods are provided below:


Visual inspections have difficulty assessing the condition of internal components.
Often, invasive methods must be used to visually inspect internal components.
FTA can assess internal components without any damage to bridge components.



The computerized simulations and knowledge-based systems require a significant
amount of technical data. FTA requires data to be input for probabilities, but it is
not as technical or sizeable. In addition, if exact information is not known, an
educated guess or probable range can be input for the probability.



SHM, computerized simulation, and sometimes visual inspections do not identify
the chain of events that lead to bridge failure. The fault-tree developed for FTA is
developed using the chain of events; therefore, the events leading to failure can be
identified through analysis.



Many of the visual inspections, computerized simulations, and computerized
knowledge-based systems discussed only assess the condition of individual
components instead of individual components and the whole bridge system. FTA
assesses the condition of individual components and identifies the relationships
between the different components to assess the failure risk of the whole bridge
system.
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With exception to some computerized simulations, all the methods mentioned are
not known to utilize or produce a visual model of the bridge system. FTA
produces a fault-tree model which visually shows the individual bridge
components with the chain of events leading to their failure and ultimately bridge
failure, as well as, the relationships between the bridge components.

Research Objectives
The objective of this research is to develop a bridge risk assessment process that
can predict failure and its key initiators prior to the occurrence of failure symptoms, such
as cracks, large deflections and corrosion. Due to the ability of fault-tree analysis (FTA)
to qualitatively and quantitatively assess bridge failure, it is utilized to develop the risk
assessment process for this research. An advantage of FTA qualitative assessment is its
ability to visually model events leading to failure and their relationships, which can be
used to define the most likely events to cause failure. The advantage of quantitative
assessment is its ability to use a variety of input data to define expected occurrence
probabilities of initiating events, which allows the assessment to take place prior to the
construction of a bridge, if desired. The FTA process developed is used to identify the
risk of bridge collapse, the events leading to collapse, and countermeasures to initiating
events.

Development of a process that is easily implementable by infrastructure

managers can help them to make informed decisions about their infrastructure plans and
budget allocations.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Current Bridge Failure Risk Analysis Methods
There are various types of bridge risk analysis methods that have been developed
over the years. Some of the simplistic methods have been used for centuries, while
others methods that utilize new technology have only been introduced in the last couple
decades. This section will take a look at bridge risk analysis methods that are related to
field inspections, computer simulations and on-site sensors. The particular methods to be
discussed are: visual inspection, Pontis model, ANN model, BRIDGIT model and SHM
sensors.
Visual Inspection
Visual bridge inspections are typically performed every two years, unless a bridge
requires more frequent inspections due to safety concerns. During inspections, the bridge
components are assigned a rating condition based on the National Bridge Inventory (NBI)
guidelines (FHWA 1995), which are similar to those found in Table 2-1. The NBI rating
system is used across the U.S. to standardize the condition ratings of bridges so the
nation’s bridge infrastructure can be assessed. The problem with these guidelines is that
they assess symptoms, which are not always present (Naito et al. 2010b). Some of the
conditions that are difficult or impossible to assess visually are:


Corrosion of reinforcement encased in concrete (Naito et al. 2010a; Naito et al.
2010b; Russell 2009)
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Presence and deterioration of grout in shear keys and ducts (Naito et al. 2010b)



Loss of post-tensioning in tendons (Naito et al. 2010b)



Deterioration of epoxy in joints



Insufficient concrete cover

Table 2-1. National Bridge Inventory Condition Rating Guidelines (FHWA 1995)
Rating

Description for Deck, Superstructure and Substructure

9

Excellent

8

Very good: no problems

7

Good: minor problems

6

Satisfactory: some minor deterioration of structural elements

5

Fair: primary structural elements are sound but may have minor section loss,
cracking, spalling or scour

4

Poor: advanced section loss, deterioration, spalling or scour

3

Serious: loss of section, deterioration, spalling or scour have seriously
affected primary structural components; local failures are possible; fatigue
cracks in steel or shear cracks in concrete

2

Critical: advanced deterioration of primary structural elements; fatigue crack
in steel or shear cracks in concrete; scour may have removed substructure
support; may be necessary to close the bridge until corrective action is taken

1

Imminent failure: major deterioration or section loss present in critical
structural components; obvious vertical or horizontal movement affecting
structure stability; bridge closed to traffic but corrective action

0

Failure: beyond corrective action; out of service

Pontis Model
Pontis is a bridge management software developed by the Cambridge Systematics
Inc. for the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in the 1990s. The Pontis model,
based on simulation of structural deterioration, depicts the bridge as a set of components
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(Cambridge Systematics, Inc. 2005; Floyd 2010; Gutkowski and Arenella 1998). In other
words, each bridge component (beams, deck, bearings, etc.) is individually modeled and
placed together to form the whole bridge system. Some of the inputs used to perform the
simulation are: inspection data, preservation policy, budget, deterioration rates, agency
costs and user costs (Cambridge Systematics, Inc. 2005). The deterioration rates and
costs are entered for each bridge component. Upon entry of the inputs, the model
simulates the bridge conditions, develops preservation policy, and makes maintenance
and/or repair recommendations for each bridge component (Cambridge Systematics, Inc.
2005).

The bridge condition assessment results from Pontis are given in terms of

(Cambridge Systematics, Inc. 2005): (1) recommendations for immediate repair needs
and future maintenance activities, (2) bridge component conditions, (3) health index and
(4) mapping to the National Bridge Inventory (NBI) condition ratings. For the purpose of
communicating risk to the general public, each bridge is given an overall rating of
sufficient, structurally deficient or functionally obsolete. These condition assessments
cover bridge components, bridge systems and bridge networks. The preservation models
are developed using historical inspection data and expert opinion, then optimized with
cost inputs using a Markovian model (Cambridge Systematics, Inc. 2005; Gutkowski and
Arenella 1998; Huang 2010). The recommended maintenance and/or repairs proposed by
Pontis are normally compiled and compared with inspector recommendations before a
bridge plan is chosen.
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ANN Model
The Articficial Neural Network (ANN) model is a forecast model that mimics the
biological neural network by adapting and changing as new information is input into the
system. The model takes into account multiple parameters, which are previously defined
through research and case studies. The parameter model inputs are gathered through
inspection reports, Pontis data and inventory data (Huang 2010). Two downfalls of the
ANN model are its reliance on good maintenance records and inability to model the
relationships between different components.
BRIDGIT Model
BRIDGIT consists of two modules: BRIDGE-1 and BRIDGE-2. BRIDGE-1 is
used on-site during inspections to record inspection data and help inspectors make
maintenance recommendations.

The knowledge-based system diagnoses a problem,

identifies its causes, and suggests repair techniques (de Brito et al. 1997). Data from the
BRIDGE-1 module is input into the BRIDGE-2 module, which ranks the defined
problems based on the safety of the bridge and maintenance policy (de Brito et al. 1997).
The same indicators alongside reliability and economic analysis are used to determine
maintenance strategies (de Brito et al. 1997). The process used by the BRIDGE-2
module is based off the Markovian model (Huang 2010).
SHM Sensors
Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) sensors continuously monitor the bridge
system in real-time. The sensors can be placed in areas of the bridge where degradation
can occur but normal inspections techniques cannot access, which allows detection of
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internal bridge damage. Detection of the damage is based on changes in the geometry or
material properties of bridge components (Farrar and Worden 2007; Worden et al. 2007).
The sensor outputs are periodically collected to compare to the historical bridge data,
which helps to assess the condition of the bridge (Doebling et al. 1996).
While SHM sensors allow prediction of the conditions of the bridge system and
individual components, its reliance on historical structural responses can make it more
difficult to predict during the early years of the bridge’s life. It can also be a challenge to
determine which structural responses are related to damage so the damage can be
properly quantified (Farrar and Worden 2007; Worden et al. 2007). Application of SHM
sensors to existing bridges can be difficult or impossible, since a lot of sensors must be
placed within bridge components. These types of sensors can only be applied to existing
bridges during replacement or retrofitting of bridge components. Application of SHM
sensors can also be very costly. Overall, SHM sensors could be a beneficial tool to use,
however, it may need to be paired up with a complementary tool to be most effective and
cost efficient.

Post-Tensioned Concrete Box Girder Bridge Failure Risk Analysis
Concrete box girder bridges emerged in the United States in the late 1950s.
Today they are favored for their quick on-site assembly. There are two main types of
concrete box girders (Figure 2-1): (1) adjacent box girders and (2) segmental box girders.
The adjacent box girder bridge, which is normally used for bridge spans 30 to 110 feet,
consists of multiple box girders of span-length aligned transversely. The box girders are
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normally individually prestressed longitudinally and connected to each other transversely
through grouted shear keys and post-tensioning tendons. The segmental box girder
bridge consists of multiple segments aligned longitudinally across the bridge span. The
segmental box girders are connected through shear keys, longitudinal post-tensioning
tendons and epoxy-filled joints. Segmental box girders can also be individually posttensioned transversely. The current design of segmental box girders calls for posttensioning tendons to be placed in non-degradable ducts filled with grout to help protect
the tendons from corrosion. The sealing of the keyways and joints with grout or epoxy
helps the adjacent beams/segments to resist against vertical shear forces. Under current
practice, shear keys and joints are protected by a waterproof barrier applied on top of the
girder system prior to placement of a wearing surface (asphalt or concrete topping);
however, some bridges have been constructed without a waterproof barrier. Together the
shear keys and post-tensioning tendons enable service loads to be distributed among the
adjacent beams/segments.
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Figure 2-1. Concrete Box Girders: (a) Adjacent (b) Segmental

The problem with concrete box girder bridges is the incline in failures and
closures. According to the work of Sharma and Mohan (2011), 21 concrete box girder
bridges failed between 1800 and 2009. The failure cases were located in Colorado,
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Virginia (Naito et al. 2010a;
Russell 2009). The leading causes of failure for all bridge types are hydraulic events
(54%), collisions (14%), overloading (12%) and deterioration (5%). For prestressed
concrete box girder bridges, deterioration seems to have a higher impact on failure,
especially in northeastern regions of the United States (Naito et al. 2010a). A survey
presented in the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Synthesis
393 on Adjacent Precast Concrete Box Beam Bridges: Connection Details (Russell
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2009), showed the skew of the bridge, presence of topping, performance of the
waterproof membrane, and bridge maintenance are the four key factors thought to have
the most influence on the long-term bridge performance. The survey results also found
longitudinal cracking along the grouting of adjacent beams and leakage of water and
chlorides through joints to be the two most common problems observed (Russell 2009).
Some of the failure modes that are particular to adjacent box beams, are:
waterproofing membrane, concrete, shear key and prestressed/post-tensioned tendon
failures. The main cause of waterproofing membrane failure is large beam displacements
due to overstressed/overloaded beams (MDOT 2005). Overstressing of beams can also
cause cracking of the concrete. Other causal factors are temperature variants, insufficient
reinforcement, premature releasing of prestressing strands during curing, loss of
prestress, concrete shrinkage during curing and concrete deterioration (MDOT 2005).
The cracks expose the interior concrete and grout to water, chlorides (deicing salts) and
acidic gases (e.g. CO2), which cause deterioration. At this stage, shear key failure can
occur due to deterioration of the shear key grout. In addition to shear key failure, the
deterioration eventually leads to corrosion of tendons. Most post-tensioning tendon
corrosion is localized at joints, shear keys and anchorage areas, where water and
chlorides have easier access to the post-tensioning reinforcement (MDOT 2005). It may
be noted that the occurrence of any one of these failures increases the likelihood of one of
the other failures occurring.

For example, failure of the waterproofing membrane

provides access for water and chlorides to penetrate into the shear key and concrete
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deteriorating the grout and concrete, which eventually leads to the corrosion of
reinforcement/tendons.
For segmental box girders, the same types of failure can occur, however there are
some differences in post-tensioned tendon failure. In current practice, post-tensioned
tendons are placed in grouted, non-degradable ducts, which provide an extra barrier for
the water and chlorides to penetrate. Once the water and chlorides get through the
segmental joints, they can enter through splits in the duct sleeves, unsealed duct joints
and unsealed grout inlets/outlets used for placement of grout inside the ducts (Corven and
Moreton 2004). Once the water and chlorides get into the duct, they begin to degrade the
grout and corrode the tendons. Bridges built during the early stages of post-tensioning
were often constructed with post-tensioning tendons inside the concrete with nondegradable duct material and no grout, because the sole purpose of the duct was to form a
void in the concrete for the tendons to go through (Corven and Moreton 2004). This
construction method allowed chloride-water quicker access to the tendons. A second
mode of failure risk exists for grouted ducts.

If the duct is not properly grouted,

accumulation of bleed water can cause corrosion of the tendons and create voids in the
grout (Corven and Moreton 2004).
These failure modes are just a few of the ways failure can occur. Several other
factors contribute to the failure of a bridge. One failure mode known to occur for all
types of bridges is scour, which is the result of flowing water eroding the abutment or
pier foundation.

When scour reduces the foundation depth enough that vertical

movement is allowed, failure can occur (Johnson 1999; LeBeau and Wadia-Fascetti
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2007). The following case study of the Lake View Drive Bridge shows some other
common failure modes seen by box girders.
Lake View Drive Bridge Failure Case Study
In December 2005, the Lake View Drive Bridge in Washington County,
Pennsylvania collapsed due to internal deterioration of reinforced concrete beams. The
bridge was a four-span prestressed adjacent box girder bridge constructed in 1960. Some
of the design and construction problems that help to accelerate the deterioration were: (1)
the absence of a waterproof barrier on the deck, (2) the absence of grouting in the shear
key, (3) open vent holes, (4) open void area, (5) inadequate development length of
reinforcement and (6) inadequate reinforcement coverage due to movement of void forms
(Harries 2009; Naito et al. 2010b). The open vent holes used during construction for
curing the concrete and the open void form allowed chloride-saturated water to enter the
box girder void. The water degraded the cardboard void form, which clogged the void
drain hole and allowed the water to sit inside the beam (Naito et al. 2010b). By allowing
the chloride-saturated water to sit inside the beam for an extended amount of time, the
corrosion of the interior reinforcement was accelerated. Perhaps, if the drain had been
larger allowing the material and water to exit the beam, the corrosion would not have
been so extreme. Together, these defects resulted in the collapse of an inner span exterior
beam.
Changes in Design and Construction Procedures
Some of the failures discussed have been prevented or improved through changes
in design and retrofits. In the 1970s, failure was seen to occur due to deterioration from
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top to bottom flange; therefore, in the 1980s, construction involved a waterproof barrier
being laid prior to the placement of the wearing surface (Naito et al. 2010a). The typical
size and placement of void drains became more consistent with two-inch diameter drains
placed every 10 to 15 feet along the beam (Corven and Moreton 2004). For adjacent box
girder bridges, void forms changed from open and degradable forms to closed-cell
polystyrene forms (Naito et al. 2010b; Russell 2009). In the construction of segmental
concrete box girder bridges, degradable duct material was replaced by non-degradable
material.

Some of the non-degradable and corrosion resistant materials used are

galvanized steel, stainless steel, polyethylene plastic, polypropylene plastic or high
density polyethylene.

In addition to helping prevent penetration of water, the high

density plastics also provide better protection from chloride ions (Corven and Moreton
2004). Even though these actions have been taken, the related failure modes should not
be ignored.

Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA) as a Risk Assessment Tool
H. A. Watson of Bell Laboratories, who was assigned by the United States Air
Force to assess the Minuteman Launch Control System, developed FTA (Ericson 1999).
FTA, a risk assessment tool, consists of two types of analysis: qualitative and
quantitative. Qualitative analysis involves developing a visual model of events leading to
failure and their relationships. Each event leading to failure is connected by an OR,
AND, EXCLUSIVE OR, INHIBIT and PRORITY AND gate. The events that make up
the fault-tree are classified as intermediate, basic, undeveloped, conditional or house
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events. Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3 show the gate and event symbols along with their
descriptions.

Gate Name

Description

OR

Output event occurs if one of the input events occurs

AND

Output event occurs if all the input events occurs

EXCLUSIVE OR

Output event occurs if one but not both of the input
events occurs

INHIBIT GATE

Output event occurs if a single input event and a
conditional event occur

PRIORITY AND

Output event occurs if all input events occur in a specific
sequential order

Figure 2-2. Fault-Tree Gate Symbols and Descriptions

Event Name
INTERMEDIATE

Description
An event that results from one or more preceding
events acting through logic gates

BASIC

Initiating event which cannot be further developed

UNDEVELOPED

An event that cannot be further developed due to
insufficient information

CONDITIONAL

A specific condition applied to an INHIBIT or
PRIORITY AND gate

HOUSE

An event which is expected to occur or not occur

Figure 2-3. Fault-Tree Event Symbols and Descriptions

In FTA, cut sets are used to describe unique combinations of events that cause the top
event to occur. Minimal cut sets are those combinations that have the shortest path to the
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top event. Quantitative analysis is performed by applying probabilities to all basic,
undeveloped, conditional and house events and using Boolean algebra and probabilistic
mathematics to solve for the occurrence probability of the top event and minimal cut sets.
The analysis results aid in the decision-making process for application of
countermeasures.
It was the unique combination of the qualitative and quantitative analysis that
gave FTA its advantage as a risk assessment tool. Dave Haasl of Boeing Company
recognized the implication of FTA as a risk analysis tool and led the application of FTA
to the entire Minuteman Missile System in 1964 (Ericson 1999). A couple years later, in
1966, Boeing began using FTA in their commercial aircraft design process (Ericson
1999).
It was Boeing Company that began trying to improve FTA, which they did
through the development of a 12-phase simulation program (Ericson 1999). However,
FTA soon entered the nuclear power industry, who is accredited for most of the major
improvements made to FTA. In 1981, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published the
Fault Tree Handbook (Haasl et al. 1981). The nuclear power industry made most of its
changes to the algorithms and codes used to run FTA. Improvements were also made
through application of FTA to catastrophic accidents, such as the NASA Apollo 1 launch
pad fire on January 27, 1967, the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident on
March 18, 1979 and the NASA Challenger Space Shuttle accident on January 28, 1986
(Ericson 1999). The majority of the improvements occurred between 1981 and 1990,
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during which time FTA began to get international recognition and began its entry into
safety software (Ericson 1999).
Over the years, FTA has entered into several industries, such as chemical process,
auto, rail transportation and robotics. Within these industries, it has been used for a
variety of assessments – “numerical requirement verification, identification of safety
critical components, product certification, product risk assessment, accident/incident
analysis, design change evaluation, visual diagrams of cause-consequence events and
common cause analysis” (Ericson 1999).

Summary and Discussion
While each of the current risk assessment methods has benefits, they also have
some limitations. For the risk assessment methods reviewed, limitations observed in one
or more methods were:


Inability to assess the condition of internal components (e.g. visual inspection)



Requirement of a significant amount of technical data for analysis (e.g. ANN
model)



No identification of the chain of events leading to bridge failure



Assessment of individual component conditions instead of individual component
and whole bridge system conditions

FTA is tool that has been used for risk assessment of products in a variety of industries
over the last 37 years. Some of the industries have applied the risk assessment prior to
the occurrence of failure, while others have used it post-failure to determine the likely
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cause of failure. Currently, FTA is not used as a risk assessment tool to prevent bridge
collapse. For this research, the application of FTA to bridge failure will be assessed.
Since the qualitative and quantitative assessments used in FTA address many of
limitations of the risk assessment methods reviewed and it has been successfully used in a
variety of industries, its application to bridge failure is expected to be beneficial. To test
the applicability of FTA as a tool for risk assessment of bridge failure, case studies were
conducted on post-tensioned concrete box girder bridges. Post-tensioned concrete box
girder bridges were chosen due to the number of closures and collapses that have
occurred over their relatively short lifetime of approximately 50 years. The bridges have
a history of bridge collapse due to internal failures, which allowed the use of FTA to
analyze internal components to be assessed. The process and methods used to perform
FTA on bridges is discussed in the Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER THREE
RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND MOTHODOLOGY

The first step in risk assessment is to research and identify plausible causes of
bridge failure for the bridge type of interest, which helps to develop the qualitative
structure of the fault-tree.

Once the qualitative part of the fault-tree is developed,

minimal cut sets can be identified and occurrence probabilities can be assigned to basic
events. Identification of the minimal cut sets with the highest probability of failure allow
for prioritization of countermeasures.

Fault-Tree Development
Before the fault-tree can be qualitatively developed, technical knowledge of the
bridge and its structural components is necessary. In addition, a list of plausible failures
and their causes must be compiled. Expert opinion, failure case studies, inspection
reports are a few sources that can be used to find this information.
Once the different failure components and causes have been identified, the faulttree can be developed. The fault-tree starts with the top event, bridge failure, and is
broken down into primary bridge components that can lead to bridge failure if the
component fails. Each component is then broken down into events that can directly lead
to the component failure. The appropriate gate is chosen to link each primary component
event to their causal events. The cause-and-effect process continues until none of the
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events can be broken down further.

The bottom events are then defined as basic,

undeveloped or house.
A fault-tree does not have to contain all events that could possibly occur; rather, it
only needs to include events that could occur within reason.

If the event has not

previously shown to be a plausible initiating event with similar bridges then, the event
may be excluded. A common rule is to use the minimum necessary number of events.
Another common practice is to avoid using the same event more than once because the
event is counted in the analysis as many times as it occurs, which results in biased
quantitative results. To avoid duplication of an event, such as a collision, that can affect
multiple bridge components, be more specific in identifying the event (i.e. specifying the
component affected).

Minimal Cut Sets
Minimal cut sets are the shortest combination of events leading to the top event.
These combinations are found using Boolean algebra. In this study, minimal cut sets
were calculated using Isograph FaultTree+ software (Figure A-1) (2008). A variety of
fault-tree software are available for constructing fault-trees and computing their cut sets.

Occurrence Probabilities
The sources that can be used to estimate the occurrence probabilities of the faulttree basic events are: public databases, experimental data, model analysis, expert opinion
and published research findings. Most of the time, probabilities found in these sources
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are not directly applicable to the basic event; therefore, statistical and probabilistic
analysis must be used to estimate the occurrence probabilities of the basic events. The
procedure used to develop the final basic event probabilities from published findings is
discussed in the following example.
Consider an example where concrete deterioration and corrosion is an initiating
failure event. For this example, the probability was calculated using data from two
studies (Wardhana and Hadiprono 2003, Sharama and Mohan 2011) on bridge failures in
the U.S. Table 3-1 shows the average number of bridges and number of failures due to
concrete deterioration and corrosion for each surveyed period. The average number of
bridges in a given period was calculated using data from previous studies and the NBI
Database (FHWA 2011).

All the data collected were used to develop the annual

probability of failure of all the bridges in the U.S. due to concrete deterioration and
corrosion. The equation used to estimate the annual probability of failure was:
Pf,N = 1 – (1 – Pf,A)N

(3-1)

where, Pf,N is the probability of failure for given period range, Pf,A is the annual
probability of failure, and N is period range in years. It should be noted that Equation 1
assumes the annual concrete deterioration and corrosion failure probabilities are
independent and uncorrelated from year to year. This assumption is not entirely true
since the failure probability will vary over time as deterioration occurs or maintenance is
performed. For simplicity, it is assumed that major maintenance is not performed over
the considered time period. Thus, the annual failure probability can be modeled as an
identical and independently distributed variable. Solving for Pf,A, the equation becomes:
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Pf,A = 1 – (1 – Pf,N)(1/N)

(3-2)

The annual probability of bridge failure due to concrete deterioration and corrosion
calculated for each study can be seen in Table 3-1. The average annual probability
calculated can then be input into the fault-tree.

Table 3-1 Bridge Failures Due to Concrete Deterioration and Corrosion
Period

Period Range Avg. No. No. of Failures
Pf,N
Pf,A
(Years)
of Bridges
1989-2000
11
592,966
1
1.69e-06 1.53e-07
1800-2009
209
600,119
8
1.33e-05 6.38e-08
Average 1.09e-07

Structural Health Monitoring Countermeasures
To prioritize implementation of countermeasures, the minimal cut sets must be
identified. Once the minimal cut sets are identified, historical data on bridge failures can
be used to develop probabilities for the occurrence of the cut sets. Countermeasures that
are expected to have the largest impact on the health of the bridge should be
implemented. In some cases, one countermeasure may be applied to a bridge to reduce
the occurrence of multiple causal factors. One type of countermeasure that can be used is
SHM sensors. Intelligent sensors installed on a bridge, act as a warning system by
alerting the infrastructure manager when events that could lead to bridge failure are
detected. The warning system allows infrastructure managers to prevent the event from
progressing by planning for maintenance activities to fix the problems. As a result, the
risk of bridge failure is reduced.
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The expected reduction in the probability of bridge failure can be calculated by
including the sensors in the fault-tree. Take an example where the annual probability of
bridge failure due to scour is 4.61e-06. After 30 years, the expected probability of failure
increases to 1.38e-04. In attempts to reduce the probability of failure due to scour at 30
years, Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR) will be applied to the bridge to monitor the
foundation depth. If the foundation depth becomes increasingly low, a warning will be
sent to the bridge manager, who will take remedial actions. As with any technology,
TDR is not 100% accurate. Four outcomes must be considered (Figure 3-1): 1) positive
detection, 2) false positive detection, 3) negative detection, and 4) false negative
detection.

Sensor
Outcomes

Positive
Detection

Scour
Present

Scour
Detected

False
Positive
Detection

No Scour
Present

Negative
Detection

Scour
Detected

No Scour
Present

No Scour
Detected

False
Negative
Detection

Scour
Present

No Scour
Detected

Figure 3-1. Sensor Detection Outcomes

TDR is expected to result in error 5% of the time. Since the probabilities input
into the fault-tree are the probabilities of bridge failure, the probability of false negative
sensor detection needs to be incorporated into the fault-tree. For illustration purpose, a
value of 0.05 is used for the probability of false negative TDR sensor detection. The new
probability of failure due to scour is the result of TDR not detecting scour and scour
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being advanced enough to cause bridge failure. Figure 3-2 shows how the sensor is
applied to the fault-tree model and the resulting new probability of bridge failure.

Figure 3-2. Bridge Failure Due to Scour and Sensor Failure

Case Studies
The first study is the development of a qualitative fault-tree analysis (FTA) model
for adjacent concrete box girder bridges. The second study is a complete FTA of a
particular bridge to determine its failure modes, risk of failure, and plausible
countermeasures.
Post-Tensioned Adjacent Concrete Box Girder Bridges
Adjacent concrete box girders are typically prestressed longitudinally.
Prestressing strands are created by pulling strands in tension prior to placement of
concrete so the concrete can cure directly against the tensioned strands.

The

manufactured beams are transported to the construction site for placement, where they
are tied together. They are usually tied together with grouted shear keys and transverse
steel rods or post-tensioned strands. The solid connection of the shear keys and lateral
ties enable the service loads to be distributed among the adjacent girders. On top of the
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girder system, either a wearing surface is directly applied or a waterproof barrier is laid
prior to placement of the wearing surface.
James B. Edwards Bridge in Charleston, SC
The James B. Edwards Bridge of Charleston, SC (Figure 3-3) constructed in 1989
consists of two post-tensioned side-by-side concrete segmental box girders. The bridge
services a section of I-526, which crosses over the Wando River (salt water), and two
two-lane roads (one at each end of the bridge). Since the bridge crosses the Wando River
closer inland, there is minimal commercial vessel traffic beneath the bridge. The twolane underpasses are also lightly traveled. There have not been any collisions to the piers
noted. Problems that have been identified through inspections by the SCDOT are (Figure
3-4): 1) improper grouting of ducts, 2) leaky joints, 3) debris in the box void, 4) clogged
void drain holes (3/4-inch diameter) and 5) cracks in the piers. Additional pictures of the
bridge can be seen in Appendix C.

Figure 3-3. James B. Edwards Bridge of Charleston, SC
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Figure 3-5. SCDOT Inspection of James B. Edwards Bridge: (a) Improper

Grouting of Ducts (b) Small Void Drain Holes (c) Cracks in Piers (d) Leaky Joints
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CHAPTER FOUR
CASE STUDY: FAULT-TREE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS FOR POST-TENSIONED
ADJACENT CONCRETE BOX GIRDER BRIDGES

Fault-Tree Development
Failure of a bridge (system failure) is usually initiated by failure of key
superstructure or substructure components, such as the beams, abutments, piers, bearing
pads and foundation. Beam collapse is due to overloading by high traffic loads or
overweight trucks, reduced strength from extreme heat, collisions, and corrosion of
reinforcement and post-tensioning tendons. Foundation failure is the result of scour,
which is caused by water flow eroding the foundations. When the foundation depth is
shallow enough that the abutment or pier can move vertically, failure can occur (LeBeau
and Wadia-Fascetti 2007). The major cause of bearing failure is extreme lateral forces
that knock the superstructure off the bearings (LeBeau and Wadia-Fascetti 2007). The
extreme lateral forces can come from environmental or collisions events. The collision
events can also cause local damage to abutments or piers, which can result in failure.
Another source of abutment and pier failure is corrosion.

The events leading to

superstructure and substructure failure can be seen in Figures 4-1 and 4-2, respectively.
It should be noted that the green colored events in the figures are the basic and
undeveloped events.
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Figure 4-1. Fault-Tree Model for Superstructure of Adjacent Box Girder Bridges

Figure 4-2. Fault-Tree Model for Substructure of Adjacent Box Girder Bridges

Superstructure Failures
Over time, the amount of traffic that bridges must handle can increase beyond the
design capacity, which leads to overloading of the girders. The girders can also be
overloaded due to reduction of girder strength. The capacity of a girder can be reduced
by temperatures above the 120°F maximum design temperature. This phenomenon has
been defined as extreme heat in the fault-tree (LeBeau and Wadia-Fascetti 2007).
Collisions and corrosion also have an effect on the beam strength. Collisions refer to
marine vessels, trucks, or trains producing large impact forces on the girders, which are a
result of height limit violations, accidents or intentional attacks. Corrosion occurs when
water with high chloride concentrations have access to reinforcement and interact with
the iron in the strands (Sianipar and Adams 1997). The chloride-water can come from
sea water or deicing salts mixed with wet weather conditions (i.e. snow, ice, rain).
The main entry point for chloride-water to tie rods is through cracks in the
concrete, waterproof barrier and keyway sealant, which are initiated by overstressed
girders undergoing large displacement (MDOT 2005). A waterproof membrane that is
defective or non-existent allows chloride-water to reach the underlying concrete and
keyways. When the chloride-water enters the grouted keyways, it flows through cracks
and further deteriorates the grout. In some instances, grouting is not properly executed
during the construction phase, which allows larger amounts of water to pass through.
Once the water passes through the keyway, it comes in contact with the tie rods, which
are placed directly below the keyway, and begins the corrosion process. Figure 4-3
shows the fault-tree developed to depict the tie rod access points.
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Figure 4-3. Fault-Tree Model for Tie Rod Access

Key entry points to reinforcement are cracks in the concrete, insufficient concrete
cover, and unsealed vent holes. Unsealed vent holes accompanied by an open void form
allows for the chloride-water to enter the box void. When the roadway slopes toward the
vent holes and a curb is in place, the amount of water that gains access to the vent holes is
even greater. Once the water enters the void, it interacts with the form and, if the form
material is degradable, the form breaks apart and makes its way to the drains. If the drain
holes are not large enough, then the material clogs the drain allowing the chloride water
to sit in the void and penetrate the internal concrete. When this happens, not only is the
loading imposed on the superstructure increased, the corrosion process is expedited
(Sianipar and Adams 1997; Naito et al. 2010). This succession of events was developed
into the fault-tree shown in Figure 4-4.
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Figure 4-4. Fault-Tree Model for Reinforcement Access

Substructure Failures
Foundation failure is due to scour, which can be characterized as one of the
following: 1) contraction scour, 2) local scour, 3) degradation, 4) channel widening and
5) lateral migration (Johnson 1999).

The causes of contraction and local scour,

respectively, are flow constrictions and obstruction in the flow due to bridge substructure.
Degradation, channel widening and lateral migration are natural occurring events.
Degradation affects the foundations by lowering the entire channel bed.

Channel

widening and lateral migration has greater affects on the abutments and piers that were
not designed to be exposed to the channel flow. The amount of scour present depends on
several factors, such as the flow characteristics, channel dimensions and material
properties.
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Environmental events with large lateral forces, such as storm surges, floods and
earthquakes have been stated to cause bearing failure (LeBeau and Wadia-Fascetti 2007).
The extreme lateral forces seen by collisions can cause bearing failures, as well as,
abutment and pier failure. The bearing failure is due to misalignment of bearing pads and
abutment and pier failures are due to severe local damage of the components. Abutment
and pier failures can also be the result of corrosion, which can occur when chloride-water
enters cracks in the abutments or piers or penetrates through the concrete cover. The
concrete cover can be penetrated when insufficient cover is provided during construction.
These events were depicted in the Figure 4-2.

Minimal Cut Sets
The minimal cut sets that appear to be most influential to the complete adjacent
box girder bridge fault-tree, shown in Figure B-1, are:


High Traffic Load



Over Weight Trucks



Fire



Marine Collision with Beam



Roadway Collision with Beam



Train Collisions with Beam



Construction Error in Beam



Earthquake



Storm Surge
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Flood



Scour



Marine Collision with Abutment or Pier



Roadway Collision with Abutment or Pier



Train Collisions with Abutment or Pier



Construction Error in Abutment or Pier

These minimal cut sets are the most critical because they have the least number of events
leading to the top failure. For this fault-tree qualitative analysis, all the most influential
minimal cut sets are single-event cut sets. The most influential cut sets could change
with quantitative analysis. The complete list of minimal cut sets is provided in Appendix
B.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CASE STUDY: FAULT-TREE ANALYSIS FOR JAMES B. EDWARDS BRIDGE

Fault-Tree Development
Superstructure Failures
The primary reasons for chloride-water in segmental concrete box girder bridges,
such as the James B. Edwards Bridge, are insufficiencies in the concrete, waterproof
barrier and keyway sealant. These key factors are similar to those discussed for adjacent
concrete box girder bridges in Chapter 4.

Once chloride-water passes through the

waterproof barrier, it enters the segmental joints. The James B. Edwards Bridge has wet
joints, which are joints sealed with a material such as grout or epoxy. When the sealant
has cracks, chloride-water flows through the cracks and further deteriorates it allowing
water to flow completely through the joint and enter the girder void. Two concerns with
chloride-water entering the void are: 1) internal reinforcement corrosion (as discussed in
Chapter 4) and 2) post-tension tendon corrosion. Tendon corrosion starts when the water
in the void comes in contact with interior ducts. Water can enter the ducts through splits,
unsealed joints or unsealed grout inlets/outlets (Corven and Moreton 2004). Water inside
the duct degrades the surrounding grout allowing direct access to the post-tensioning
tendons. Often, the ducts are not properly grouted during construction, which allows
water from grout bleeding or external sources to have more direct access to the tendons.
The fault-tree developed for the superstructure is shown in Figure 5-1. The corrosion
processes are depicted as undeveloped events for quantitative analysis purposes.
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Figure 5-1. Fault-Tree Model for James B. Edwards Bridge Superstructure Failure

Substructure Failures
The substructure failures for the James B. Edwards Bridge are the same as those
described for the Adjacent Concrete Box Girder in Chapter 4 except for train collisions,
which are not considered in the FTA. The final substructure fault-tree can be seen in
Figure 5-2. For quantitative assessment purposes, the fault-tree depicts the concretecorrosion event as an undeveloped event.

Minimal Cut Sets
Each of the minimal cut sets for the James B. Edwards Bridge fault-tree (Figure
C-9) are single-event cut sets; therefore, each basic event is considered equally influential
to the top event, bridge failure. The minimal cut sets are listed in Appendix C. In the
next section, quantitative analysis will be performed to rank the minimal cut sets
according to their probability of occurrence.

Occurrence Probabilities
The sources used to develop probabilities for fault-tree events were: 1) studies on
bridge failures, 2) bridge inspection reports and 3) expert opinion. The work of Harik
(1990), Wardhana and Hadiprono (2003) and Sharma and Mohan (2011) were consulted
for analysis of bridge failures in the U.S. Information on post-tensioned tendon failure
was gathered from Woodward (2001). A compilation of the data used for development
of annual probabilities can be seen in Table C-1.

Prior to calculating the annual

probabilities, each event was assumed to follow a certain trend. For this fault-tree, the
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Figure 5-2. Fault-Tree Model for James B. Edwards Bridge Substructure Failure

occurrence probability of each event was assumed to be either constant, for a time
invariant event (e.g. construction error), or follow Equation 3-2. The annual failure
probabilities, Pf,A, were estimated using the procedure discussed in Chapter 3 using
published failure statistics. Constant trends were calculated by taking the average of the
Pf,N values. Since some of the data, such as roadway collision, were not broken down
into the components (i.e. beam or pier) they affect, resulting probabilities were divided
among the components based on field observations of the James B. Edwards Bridge. The
trend,

ratio,

and

annual

probability

for

each

basic

event

are

given

Table 5-1. Note that “B” refers to beam and “A/P” refers to abutment or pier.

Table 5-1. Annual Failure Probabilities Used for Fault-Tree Analysis
Failure Mode
Pf,A
Construction Error (A/P)
2.60e-05
Construction Error (B)
2.60e-05
Earthquake
1.38e-06
Fire
3.90e-05
Flood
1.04e-05
Marine Collision
4.36e-05
Marine Collision (A/P)
1.63e-07
Marine Collision (B)
5.43e-08
Overload
3.18e-06
PT Tendon Corrosion
2.40e-06
Reinforcement Corrosion
1.09e-07
Roadway Collision
6.64e-05
Roadway Collision (A/P)
1.73e-07
Roadway Collision (B)
2.61e-07
Scour
4.61e-06
Storm Surge
2.17e-07
* 1. (Harik 1990)
2. (Sharma and Mohan 2011)
3. (Wardhana and Hadiprono 2003)
4. (Woodward 2001)

Reference*
2,3
2,3
2,3
1,2,3
1,2,3
1,2,3

1,2,3
4
2,3
1,2,3

1,2,3
2,3
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Trend Notes
Constant
Constant
Equation 3-2
Equation 3-2
Equation 3-2
Constant
0.75 of Marine Collision
0.25 of Marine Collision
Equation 3-2
Equation 3-2
Equation 3-2
Constant
0.40 of Roadway Collision
0.60 of Roadway Collision
Equation 3-2
Equation 3-2

in

The NBI data for North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia were used to
compare the deterioration rates of segmental bridges to all bridge types (Figures 5-3). In
Figure 5-3, the numerous ratings of 9 near the end of the bridge design life are a result of
maintenance and repairs completed on bridges; therefore, the estimated median
deterioration rate also includes maintenance and repair activities. The process used for
fitting the median estimate curve to the NBI data is described in Appendix D. The
comparison was used to make any necessary adjustments to the probabilistic data that
was representative of all bridge types. The initial median superstructure ratings were
approximately the same but by the age of 50 there was a difference of approximately one
rating unit, which indicates a small variation in the deterioration rates of the
superstructures. The superstructure deterioration rate of segmental bridges was larger
than the average of other bridge types.

The median substructure ratings remained

approximately the same throughout the 50 years. Due to the small differences between
the superstructure and substructure ratings, no adjustments were made to the calculated
basic event probabilities.
Infrastructure safety is often measured in terms of a structural reliability index, β,
which is defined by:
β = Φ-1 (1- Pf)

(5-1)

where Φ-1(∙) is the inverse function of the standard normal cumulative density function
(CDF) and Pf is the probability of failure. A beta value of 3.1 has been accepted by the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) as the target reliability index under
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Figure 5-3. NBI Rating Comparison of Segmental Bridges and All Bridge Types

ISO 2394 (1998); therefore, a bridge with a beta value less than 3.1 is considered
structurally unsafe. The equivalent probability of failure is 1.00e-03, where a probability
of failure greater than 1.00e-03 is considered unsafe.
Since the bridge is currently in service and considered safe by the SCDOT, the
fault-tree result for bridge failure at 22 years of age was expected to be less than 1.00e03. At the age of 50, the fault-tree result for bridge failure was expected to be close to
1.00e-03, since bridges usually have a design life of 50 years. The fault-tree results were
as expected with a failure probability of 5.85e-04 at 22 years of age and 1.21e-03 at 50
years of age. Figure 5-4 shows the FTA results for the probability of bridge failure and
the corresponding reliability index over the expected lifetime of the bridge, which were
computed by solving the fault-tree at each year.
In order to determine the minimal cut sets with the highest risk of failure,
probabilities were calculated for each minimal cut set. The top five cut sets based on the
calculated probabilities can be seen in Table 5-2. A ranking of all the minimal cut sets
and their probabilities can be found in Table C-2.

Table 5-2. Top Five Minimal Cut Sets Based on Probability of Occurrence
1
2
3
4
5

Minimal Cut Set
Flood
Scour
Overload
PT Tendon Corrosion
Earthquake

Probability of Occurrence at Age 50
5.20e-04
2.30e-04
1.59e-04
1.20e-04
6.91e-05
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Figure 5-4. Failure Probability and Reliability Index versus Age of the James B. Edwards Bridge

Countermeasures
To identify and implement the most beneficial and cost-effective countermeasure
options, the countermeasures should be focused on the most influential minimal cut sets
based on failure probability. For this case study, implementation of SHM sensors was
considered. Examples of SHM sensors that could be applied to the top five minimal cut
sets are listed in Table 5-3. While some of the minimal cut sets, such as an earthquake,
are impossible to prevent, SHM sensors can also be used to monitor the effects of an
event to determine the safety of the bridge. A list of SHM sensors for all applicable basic
events is in Table C-3. An example of how a sensor/countermeasure would be added to
the fault-tree for analysis is shown in Figure C-12. For the example, TDR was applied to
scour.

Table 5-3. Examples of SHM Sensors for Top Five Minimal Cut Sets
Minimal Cut Set
Flood

Scour

SHM Sensors

Ref*

Accelerometers
Velocity Transducers
Dynamic Fiber Optic Strain Gages
Dynamic Foil Strain Gages
Dynamic Vibrating Strain Gages
Fiber Bragg Grating (FBG) Accelerometers
FBG Pressure Sensors
Fiber Bragg Grating Laser (FBGL) Vibration Sensors
Girder Edge Displacement Gages
Global Positioning System (GPS)
Long Period Grating (LPG) Sensors
Pi Phase Shifted Grating Sensors
Roadway Weather Sensor System

2,3,5
2
2,3,4
4
3,4
3,4
3
3
3
3,5
3
3

Tuned Mass Damper (TMD) Displacement Gages
Acoustic Distance Meters
Contact Sensors
Fiber Optic Scour Gages
FBGL Hydrophones

3
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2
5
5
3

Table 5-3. Examples of SHM Sensors for Top Five Minimal Cut Sets (Cont.)
Minimal Cut Set
Scour (Cont.)
Overload
PT Tendon Corrosion

SHM Sensors
Magnetic Collars
Time Domain Reflectometry Sensors

Ref*
2
2

FBG Ultrasound Sensors

3

Weight-In Motion (WIM) Sensors

1,5

Chirp Grating Sensors
Dynamic Fiber Optic Strain Gages
Dynamic Foil Strain Gages
Dynamic Vibrating Strain Gages
Fabry-Perot Interferometric Fiber Optic Sensors
FBG Strain Gages
FBGL Strain Gages
Fiber Optic Michelson Interferometers
SBS Distributed Fibers
Chloride Sensors
LPG Chemical Sensors
Earthquake
Accelerometers
Velocity Transducers
Dynamic Fiber Optic Strain Gages
Dynamic Foil Strain Gages
Dynamic Vibrating Strain Gages
FBG Accelerometers
FBG Pressure Sensors
FBGL Vibration Sensors
Girder Edge Displacement Gages
GPS
LPG Sensors
Pi Phase Shifted Grating Sensors
Seismometers
TMD Displacement Gages
* 1. (Ansari 2009)
4. (Mufti 2001)
2. (Atamturktur 2011)
5. (Wenzel 2009)
3. (Chang and Mehta 2010)
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3
2,3,4
4
3,4
4
3,4
3
3
3
5
3
2,3,5
2
2,3,4
4
3,4
3,4
3
3
3
3,5
3
3
3
3

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

FTA is not a replacement for current risk assessment methods but in combination
with visual inspection and SHM sensors it can make an improvement in the bridge
management process. The fault-tree model allows for internal components to be assessed
prior to visual inspections, which can help inspectors focus on the components that have
a high influence on bridge failure and eliminate invasive inspection techniques that may
be unnecessary. The model also allows events leading to bridge failure to be identified
and assessed individually and as a system of events, which allows the impact of
individual events and their relationships on bridge failure to be analyzed. These aspects
make the qualitative analysis component of FTA a great tool for determining the
initiating bridge failure events.
The quantitative analysis component of FTA can provide more useful information
for bridge management, but numerous difficulties can arise. Often there is a lack of
numerical data available on a basic event’s contribution to bridge failure. In the James B.
Edwards Bridge case study (Chapter 5), this issue was overcome by creating an
undeveloped event at a high level with available data and eliminating the initiating events
that had a lack of numerical data. The problem with this method is the initiating events
that are the leading causes of the undeveloped event failure are unknown. Lab tests,
finite element analysis (FEA) models, and field tests/observations over multiple years
could provide more probabilistic data allowing all initiating events to remain in the fault-
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tree for quantitative analysis; however, it is likely there will still be some events that have
little numerical data available. For those events, expert opinion, sensitivity analysis, and
probabilistic ranges can provide information accurate enough for use in countermeasure
assessment and application. This was shown through the case study on the James B.
Edwards Bridge.
For the James B. Edwards Bridge, the five most critical events that lead to bridge
were found to be floods, scour, overloading, post-tensioning tendon corrosion and
earthquakes. These critical events should be focused on by bridge management for the
James B. Edwards Bridge, as well as other similar segmental concrete box girder bridges.
Possible countermeasures were found for all of the critical events.
Since FTA probabilistic and validation data are sometimes difficult to find, the
accuracy of the FTA results cannot be quantified with certainty. While FTA could be
used as a tool for prediction of the age at which bridge failure will occur, more reliable
probabilistic data would help the success of FTA as a bridge risk assessment tool.
In the future, FTA could be combined with NBI ratings, which are subjective, to
quantify the risk of failure of each component. Since not all bridge types have the same
risk of failure, FTA would have to be performed for each different bridge type. Then, the
failure probabilities over a 50 year lifespan would be mapped to the median NBI rating
estimate over the same 50 year lifespan. An example of this mapping procedure is briefly
discussed in Appendix D.
The methods presented in this thesis are for assessment of an individual bridge.
In order for bridges to be assessed as part of the transportation network, the consequence
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of failure should also be analyzed.

The addition of consequence would allow

infrastructure managers to distribute their funds and time more effectively. Once the
bridges with the highest risk have been identified within the network, FTA can be applied
to the individual bridges as described in Chapter 3 to determine proper countermeasures.
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Figure A-1. Isograph FaultTree+ Interface
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APPENDIX B
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Complete list of the minimal cut sets for adjacent box girder bridge fault-tree:


High Traffic Load



Over Weight Trucks



Fire



Marine Collision with Beam



Roadway Collision with Beam



Train Collision with Beam



Construction Error with Beam



Deicing Salts ∩ Water ∩ Insufficient Water Barrier ∩ Insufficient Grout



Deicing Salts ∩ Water ∩ Insufficient Water Barrier ∩ Dry Joint Construction



Deicing salts ∩ Water ∩ Insufficient Water Barrier ∩ Water Absorbent Material



Seawater ∩ Insufficient Water Barrier ∩ Insufficient Grout



Seawater ∩ Insufficient Water Barrier ∩ Dry Joint Construction



Seawater ∩ Insufficient Water Barrier ∩ Water Absorbent Material



Deicing salts ∩ Water ∩ Concrete Overstress



Seawater ∩ Concrete Overstress



Deicing salts ∩ Water ∩ Insufficient Drain Size ∩ Degradable Void Form ∩
Open Void Form ∩ Unsealed Vent Holes



Seawater ∩ Insufficient Drain Size ∩ Degradable Void Form ∩ Open Void Form
∩ Unsealed Vent Holes



Earthquake



Storm Surge
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Flood



Scour



Marine Collision with Abutment or Pier



Roadway Collision with Abutment or Pier



Train Collision with Abutment or Pier



Construction Error with Abutment or Pier



Deicing salts ∩ Water ∩ Concrete Overstress



Seawater ∩ Concrete Overstress
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Figure B-1. Fault-Tree for Adjacent Box Girder Bridges

APPENDIX C
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Figure C-1. Roadway beneath James B. Edwards Bridge
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Figure C-2. James B. Edwards Bridge over Wando River

Figure C-3. View Inside James B. Edwards Bridge
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Figure C-4. James B. Edwards Bridge: Grout Voids and Tendon Exposure in Ducts
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Figure C-5. James B. Edwards Bridge: Efflorescence from Leaky Joints
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Figure C-6. James B. Edwards Bridge: Leaky Joint with Exposed Rebar
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Figure C-7. James B. Edwards Bridge: Large Spall in Segment Roof near Joint

Figure C-8. James B. Edwards Bridge Bearing
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List of minimal cut sets for James B. Edwards Bridge fault-tree:


Overloading



Fire



Marine Collision with Beam



Roadway Collision with Beam



Construction Error with Beam



Concrete-Corrosion of Beam



Post-tensioning (PT) Tendon Corrosion



Earthquake



Storm Surge



Flood



Scour



Marine Collision with Abutment or Pier



Roadway Collision with Abutment or Pier



Construction Error with Abutment or Pier



Concrete-Corrosion of Abutment or Pier
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Table C-1. Data Used for Calculation of Probabilities
Reference
Harik

Period
1951-1988

Period
Range (N)
37

Avg. No. of
Bridges
587717

Sharma

1800-2009

209

600119

Wardhana

1989-2000

11

592966

Woodward

Failure Mode
Scour
Flood
Roadway Collision
Marine Collision
Overload
Fire
Scour
Flood
Roadway Collision
Marine Collision
Overload
Fire
Construction Error
Earthquake
Storm Surge
Concrete-Corrosion & Conc. Deterioration
Scour
Flood
Roadway Collision
Marine Collision
Overload
Fire
Construction Error
Earthquake
Storm Surge
Concrete-Corrosion & Conc. Deterioration
PT Tendon Corrosion

No. of
Failures
6
8
19
18
22
4
200
695
86
50
224
50
18
20
16
8
78
165
14
10
44
16
13
17
2
1

Pf,N
1.02e-05
1.36e-05
3.23e-05
3.06e-05
3.74e-05
6.81e-06
3.33e-04
1.16e-03
1.43e-04
8.33e-05
3.73e-04
8.33e-05
3.00e-05
3.33e-05
2.67e-05
1.33e-05
1.32e-04
2.78e-04
2.36e-05
1.69e-05
7.42e-05
2.70e-05
2.19e-05
2.87e-05
3.37e-06
1.69e-06
2.40e-06

Figure C-9. James B. Edwards Bridge Fault-Tree

Figure C-10. NBI Superstructure Rating Error Comparison (a) Normalized Error (b) Mean (c) Variance

Figure C-11. NBI Substructure Rating Error Comparison (a) Normalized Error (b) Mean (c) Variance

Table C-2. Minimal Cut Set Ranking Based on Probability of Occurrence
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
12
13
14
15

Minimal Cut Set
Flood
Scour
Overload
PT Tendon Corrosion
Earthquake
Fire
Construction Error (AP)
Construction Error (B)
Storm Surge
Concrete-Corrosion (AP)
Concrete-Corrosion (B)
Roadway Collision (B)
Roadway Collision (AP)
Marine Collision (AP)
Marine Collision (B)

Probability of Occurrence at Age 50
5.20e-04
2.30e-04
1.59e-04
1.20e-04
6.91e-05
3.90e-05
2.56e-05
2.56e-05
1.09e-05
5.43e-06
5.43e-06
2.61e-07
1.74e-07
1.63e-07
5.43e-08

70

Table C-3. Examples of SHM Sensors for Applicable Minimal Cut Sets
Minimal Cut Set
Overloading
Fire

SHM Sensors
Weight-In Motion (WIM) Sensors

Fiber Bragg Grating (FGB) Temperature Gages
Fiber Bragg Grating Laser (FBGL) Temperature Gages
Stimulated Brillouin Scattering (SBS) Distributed Fibers
Thermisters
Thermometers
Concrete-Corrosion
Chirp Grating Sensors
Dynamic Fiber Optic Strain Gages
Dynamic Foil Strain Gages
Dynamic Vibrating Strain Gages
Fabry-Perot Interferometric Fiber Optic Sensors
FBG Strain Gages
FBGL Strain Gages
Fiber Optic Michelson Interferometers
SBS Distributed Fibers
Chloride Sensors
LPG Chemical Sensors
PT Tendon Corrosion Chirp Grating Sensors
Dynamic Fiber Optic Strain Gages
Dynamic Foil Strain Gages
Dynamic Vibrating Strain Gages
Fabry-Perot Interferometric Fiber Optic Sensors
FBG Strain Gages
FBGL Strain Gages
Fiber Optic Michelson Interferometers
SBS Distributed Fibers
Chloride Sensors
LPG Chemical Sensors
Earthquake
Accelerometers
Velocity Transducers
Dynamic Fiber Optic Strain Gages
Dynamic Foil Strain Gages
Dynamic Vibrating Strain Gages
FBG Accelerometers
FBG Pressure Sensors
FBGL Vibration Sensors
Girder Edge Displacement Gages
GPS
LPG Sensors
Pi Phase Shifted Grating Sensors
Seismometers
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Ref*
1,5

3,4
3
3
4
3
3
2,3,4
4
3,4
4
3,4
3
3
3
5
3
3
2,3,4
4
3,4
4
3,4
3
3
3
5
3
2,3,5
2
2,3,4
4
3,4
3,4
3
3
3
3,5
3
3
3

Table C-. Examples of SHM Sensors for Applicable Minimal Cut Sets (Cont.)
Minimal Cut Set
Earthquake (Cont.)
Storm Surge

Flood

Scour

SHM Sensors

Ref*

TMD Displacement Gages
Accelerometers
Velocity Transducers
Dynamic Fiber Optic Strain Gages
Dynamic Foil Strain Gages
Dynamic Vibrating Strain Gages
Fiber Bragg Grating (FBG) Accelerometers
FBG Pressure Sensors
Fiber Bragg Grating Laser (FBGL) Vibration Sensors
Girder Edge Displacement Gages
Global Positioning System (GPS)
Long Period Grating (LPG) Sensors
Pi Phase Shifted Grating Sensors
Roadway Weather Sensor System
Tuned Mass Damper (TMD) Displacement Gages
Accelerometers
Velocity Transducers
Dynamic Fiber Optic Strain Gages
Dynamic Foil Strain Gages
Dynamic Vibrating Strain Gages
FBG Accelerometers
FBG Pressure Sensors
FBGL Vibration Sensors
Girder Edge Displacement Gages
GPS
LPG Sensors
Pi Phase Shifted Grating Sensors
Roadway Weather Sensor System

3
2,3,5
2
2,3,4
4
3,4
3,4
3
3
3
3,5
3
3

TMD Displacement Gages
Acoustic Distance Meters
Contact Sensors
Fiber Optic Scour Gages
FBGL Hydrophones
Magnetic Collars
Time Domain Reflectometry Sensors
FBG Ultrasound Sensors

3

* 1. (Ansari 2009)
2. (Atamturktur 2011)
3. (Chang and Mehta 2010)

4. (Mufti 2001)
5. (Wenzel 2009)
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3
2,3,5
2
2,3,4
4
3,4
3,4
3
3
3
3,5
3
3

2
5
5
3
2
2
3

Figure C-12. Example Application of Countermeasure to James B. Edwards Bridge

APPENDIX D
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MAPPING PROBABILITY OF FAILURE TO NBI RATINGS

Currently, the NBI ratings used by inspectors do not provide an insight on the
likelihood of bridge failure. The mapping procedure described here combines NBI data
and failure probabilities from FTA to develop failure probability estimates for each NBI
rating. Since the substructure and superstructure are the main subsystems of a bridge,
failure probabilities will only be applied to those subsystems. Even though the same NBI
rating scale and descriptors are used for both subsystems, their corresponding
probabilities of failure will not be the same. The probability of failure for each NBI
rating will also vary by bridge type; therefore, the mapping procedure should be done for
each bridge type listed in the NBI.

Development of Median NBI Rating Estimate
First, gather NBI superstructure and substructure rating data for similar bridge
types from multiple states over several years. The data used could be from locations all
over the U.S. or from states with similar environments.

For this example, the

substructure ratings for segmental box girder bridges from FL, NC, SC and VA for years
1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010 are considered. Once the data is gathered, create a
scatter plot of the ratings over time as shown in Figure D-1. Then calculate the median
estimate of the NBI ratings,

NBI,

as a function of bridge age using an exponential decay

function:
NBI

= c1 exp(-c2t)

(D-1)
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where t is the bridge age (year) and c1 and c2 are regression parameters, which are
determined using least-square fitting. An exponential decay function was chosen because
it does not output a rating below the NBI scale, which ranges from 0 to 9. When data
appears to have a more linear trend as in Figure D-1, a linear function can also be used
but conditional bounds need to be applied.

Figure D-1. Median Estimate of NBI Ratings versus Bridge Age

To assess the fitting of the median rating estimate,

NBI

, in relation to the actual

NBI rating, RNBI, a normalized error term is defined:
ε=

+ 0.5

(D-2)

where a normalized error value of 0.5 is defined as no error, 0 as an underestimate, and 1
as an overestimate. Then, fit the normalized error to Beta distribution, a continuous
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probability distribution that defines a variable on the interval between 0 and 1. The
cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the Beta distribution is:
F
where

1

=

B

=(1- )(

and
1-

0

B

y

-1

1-y

-1

dy

are the Beta distribution parameters:
-1),

mean,

(D-3)
B=

(

1-

-1) and

= variance, and ( ∙ ) is the Beta function. For the

Beta distribution, it is recommended that the NBI ratings be divided into multiple bins of
equal age interval, preferably five-year intervals. Once each bin has been fitted to Beta
distribution, the mean and variance of the normalized error for each bin can be computed
using Equation D-2. Figures D-2 and D-3 show the mean and variance of the normalized
error for the NBI substructure ratings from Figure D-1.

Figure D-2. Mean of Normalized Error versus Bridge Age
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Figure D-2 shows the mean of the normalized error for all of the age bins are
approximately equal to 0.5; therefore, for analysis purposes, the mean of the normalized
error can be kept constant at 0.5. The assumption of constant mean value is justifiable
since the normalized errors are randomly distributed around 0.5 and do not show any
increasing or decreasing trend with age.

Figure D-3. Variance of Normalized Error versus Bridge Age

The overall variance in Figure D-3 shows an increasing trend with age. The
increasing trend is due to the larger fluctuations in ratings that occur with age. To
capture this trend, the variance values as a function of age are fitted to a second order
polynomial equation:
υ = a2t2 + a1t + a0

(D-4)
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where coefficients a0, a1 and a2 are determined using a least-square regression technique.
It should be noted that bins from years 0 to 5 and 25 to 30 were not included in the
fitting. Age bin 0 to 5 was excluded to show a continually increasing trend and bin 25 to
30 was excluded due to an outlier in the data set.
The mean (i.e. 0.5) and the variance function can be used to estimate the Beta
distribution parameters (

B

and

B)

of the NBI ratings for each year. The new Beta

distribution and calculated median estimate of the NBI ratings (Equation D-1) are then
used for the procedure of mapping failure probability to the NBI ratings.

Calculation of Failure Probability
The methodology described in Chapter 3 can be used to calculate the failure
probability of the subsystem (i.e. substructure, superstructure), which will be mapped to
the NBI ratings. The failure probability of the substructure used for this example is
shown in Figure D-4.
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Figure D-4. Substructure Failure Probability versus Bridge Age

Mapping Procedure
The failure probability range will be assigned to each subsystem NBI rating. The
range will be given from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile. The first step is to find
the year at which each NBI rating (i.e. 9, 8, 7, 6, etc.) occurs on the median estimate
curve. Then, find the normalized error at the lower and upper bounds for those years.
This can be calculated by taking the inverse of the cumulative Beta distribution function
for a given year. Then, use the NBI rating (median estimate) and normalized error to
calculate the lower/upper bound NBI rating using Equation D-2. Find the lower/upper
bound rating on the median estimate curve. At the year the lower/upper rating occurs on
the median estimate curve, find the corresponding failure probability using the FTA
results. The results for the segmental concrete box girder bridge substructure example
are shown in Table D-1.
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The same procedure can be used for the superstructure. Once an NBI rating has
been assigned to a substructure and superstructure of a bridge, their defined failure
probabilities can be used to calculate the probability of bridge failure using Boolean
algebra (same principles as FTA): (substructure failure)
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(superstructure failure).

Table D-1. Example Results: Substructure NBI Ratings and Corresponding Failure Probabilities
Rating

Description

Failure Probability

Reliability

< 2.63e-05

> 4.0

9

Excellent

8

Very good: no problems

2.63e-05 – 2.24e-04

3.5 – 4.0

7

Good: minor problems

2.71e-04 – 6.64e-04

3.2 – 3.5

6

Satisfactory: some minor deterioration of structural elements

6.06e-04 – 1.25e-03

3.0 – 3.2

5

Fair: primary structural elements are sound but may have minor section loss,
cracking, spalling or scour

9.27e-04 – 2.04e-03

2.9 – 3.1

4

Poor: advanced section loss, deterioration, spalling or scour

> 1.00e-03

< 3.1

3

Serious: loss of section, deterioration, spalling or scour have seriously
affected primary structural components; local failures are possible; fatigue
cracks in steel or shear cracks in concrete

> 1.00e-03

< 3.1

2

Critical: advanced deterioration of primary structural elements; fatigue crack
in steel or shear cracks in concrete; scour may have removed substructure
support; may be necessary to close the bridge until corrective action is taken

> 1.00e-03

< 3.1

1

Imminent failure: major deterioration or section loss present in critical
structural components; obvious vertical or horizontal movement affecting
structure stability; bridge closed to traffic but corrective action

> 1.00e-03

< 3.1

0

Failure: beyond corrective action; out of service

> 1.00e-03

< 3.1
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